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ABSTRACT. Mental models are personal, internal representations of external reality that people use to
interact with the world around them. They are constructed by individuals based on their unique life
experiences, perceptions, and understandings of the world. Mental models are used to reason and make
decisions and can be the basis of individual behaviors. They provide the mechanism through which new
information is filtered and stored. Recognizing and dealing with the plurality of stakeholder’s perceptions,
values, and goals is currently considered a key aspect of effective natural resource management (NRM)
practice. Therefore, gaining a better understanding of how mental models internally represent complex,
dynamic systems and how these representations change over time will allow us to develop mechanisms to
enhance effective management and use of natural resources. Realizing this potential, however, relies on
developing and testing adequate tools and techniques to elicit these internal representations of the world
effectively. This paper provides an interdisciplinary synthesis of the literature that has contributed to the
theoretical development and practical application of the mental model construct. It explores the utility and
applicability of the construct in the context of NRM and includes a review of elicitation techniques used
within the field. The major theoretical and practical challenges that arise in drawing on the construct to
provide a cognitive dimension to NRM are also addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
Gaining insight into those aspects of human
cognition that underpin preferences, action, and
behavior is of great value to the field of natural
resource management (NRM). Environmental
problems are largely driven by human decisions and
actions, as are the strategies designed to address
such problems. In the past, NRM researchers have
attempted to understand behavior by focusing on
stakeholders’ attitudes, preferences, and values.
These social science constructs, while providing
important insights, fail to account for the human
capacity to predict outcomes or analyze cause-effect
relationships and hence frame their selection of
responses.
It is widely accepted in the cognitive science and
psychology literature that people develop and use
internal representations, i.e., ‘mental models’, of
external reality that allow them to interact with the
world (Craik 1943, Johnson-Laird 1983). People
must know about their environment so they can exist
within it (Moore and Golledge 1976). Mental
models are conceived of as a cognitive structure that
forms the basis of reasoning, decision making, and,
with the limitations also observed in the attitudes
literature, behavior. They are constructed by
individuals based on their personal life experiences,
perceptions, and understandings of the world. They
provide the mechanism through which new
information is filtered and stored.
Peoples’ ability to represent the world accurately,
however, is always limited and unique to each
individual. Mental models are therefore characterized
as incomplete representations of reality. They are
also regarded as inconsistent representations
because they are context-dependant and may change
according to the situation in which they are used. In
essence, mental models have to be highly dynamical
models to adapt to continually changing
circumstances and to evolve over time through
learning. Conceptualizing cognitive representations
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as dynamic, inaccurate models of complex systems
acknowledges the limitations in peoples’ ability to
conceive such complex systems.
Mental models exist within the mind and are
therefore not available for direct inspection or
measurement. Finding ways of eliciting a mental
model presents a major challenge to any discipline
interested in using the construct as a means to gain
insight into people’s internal representations of the
world. A variety of elicitation tools and techniques
have been developed and used in different fields of
applied research, including organizational research
(Hall et al. 1994, Swan and Newell 1998, Sterman
2000), risk communication (Breakwell 2001,
Morgan et al. 2002, Hodgkinson et al. 2004, Lowe
and Lorenzoni 2007), human-computer interaction
(Cooke 1999), and education (Osborne and
Cosgrove 1983, Vosniaudou and Brewer 1992,
Samarapungavan et al. 1996, Dove et al. 1999).
To understand the role of mental models in NRM
we need to know what they are and how they have
been conceptualized in different disciplines. We
provide theoretical background to the empirical
analysis of the papers in this issue by presenting an
interdisciplinary synthesis of the mental model
literature. The paper defines mental models and
shows how the construct is used across disciplines.
It discusses the potential contribution of the mental
model construct to the field of NRM, and the major
challenges that must be addressed to realize this
potential.
WHAT IS A MENTAL MODEL ?
A cognitive representation
Mental models are cognitive representations of
external reality. The notion of a mental model was
originally postulated by the psychologist Kenneth
Craik (1943) who proposed that people carry in their
minds a small-scale model of how the world works.
These models are used to anticipate events, reason,
and form explanations. Decades later, psychologist
Johnson-Laird (1983) further developed Craik’s
idea of a mental model in his research on human
reasoning. For Johnson-Laird, a mental model is a
reasoning mechanism that exists in a person’s
working memory. His research, carried out within
the domain of experimental psychology, supports
Craik’s claim that people reason by way of thought
experiments using internal models.
Another major body of research that draws on the
mental model construct is known as ‘naive theory’,
also referred to as ‘naive physics’. Research
explores how people develop an understanding of
causal processes associated with physical or
mechanical systems. Studies have led theorists to
assert that mental models are formed through
analogical thinking. According to Collins and
Gentner (1987), when a person explains a domain
with which they are unfamiliar, they tend to draw
on a familiar domain, which they perceive as
similar. This involves tapping into an existing
mental model and importing its relational structure
to another domain. For example, a mental model of
water flow may be used to explain electrical current;
entities and relations corresponding to the former
are mapped on to the model representing the latter.
Studies show that phenomena that cannot be
perceived directly are often explained this way
(Rickheit and Sichelschmidt 1999).
Gentner and Gentner (1983) and Collins and
Gentner (1987) questioned whether people use
analogies as a convenient way of talking about
another domain or whether they actually think in
analogies. Experimental studies examining peoples
explanations of electricity (Gentner and Gentner
1983) and water molecules (Collins and Gentner
1987) provide evidence in support of the idea that
people do indeed use analogies in their cognitive
processes. Analogical thinking allows people to
“create new mental models that they can then run
to generate predictions about what should happen
in various situations in the real world” (Collins and
Gentner 1987:243). Mental models thus act as
inferential frameworks (Gentner and Gentner
1983), as originally posed by Craik.
Abel et al. (1998), in acknowledging that theory on
cognitive mapping originated from spatial cognition
studies, conceptualize a cognitive map as a ‘spatial
mental model’. ‘Cognitive mapping’ is the process
through which a person acquires, stores, codes, and
recalls information about the world. Like Craik’s
notion of a mental model, the process of cognitive
mapping provides a reasoning and predictive
capacity: it “enables people to generalize on the
basis of past experiences and to use these
generalizations (or generic information) in other
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contexts” (Downs 1976:69). However, reasoning
and prediction processes are carried out via
associations and networks of mental objects, often
referred to as ‘schema’, rather than qualitative
thought experiments using symbolic models, as
proposed by Craik and Johnson-Laird.
Although the literature shows consensus on the
point that mental models are typically analogous
representations, a discrepancy exists over where in
the mind mental models are hypothetically located:
working memory (Johnson-Laird 1983, Wilson and
Rutherford 1989, Vosniaudou 1994), long-term
memory (Craik 1943, Bainbridge 1991, Moray
2004), or both (Nersessian 2002). Johnson-Laird
has provided tangible evidence supporting the idea
that mental models are temporary structures that
occupy working memory, based on psychological
experiments involving simple, static phenomena.
He agrees, however, that a mental model can
represent either long-term or short-term knowledge
(1989) and can represent physical or conceptual
entities (Johnson-Laird 1983).
Those who conceptualize mental models as residing
in long-term memory, i.e., mainly naive theory and
systems researchers, view them as long-term
knowledge structures that ‘support’ reasoning and
understanding (Nersessian 2002). In that sense,
mental models are similar to the ‘schema’ construct.
Originally introduced by Bartlett (1932), schema
are conceived of as long-term knowledge structures
which people use to interpret and make predictions
about the world around them. In the early 1980s,
Johnson-Laird (1983) stated that the difference
between schemata and mental models is yet to be
resolved, others have since differentiated between
the concepts (Table 1).
Nersessian (2002) bridges the working memory vs.
long-term memory discrepancy by stating that
mental models that exist as knowledge structures in
long-term memory are called upon to support the
mental models formed in working memory that are
used to support reasoning and problem-solving.
Conceiving a mental model as a cognitive structure
that may exist in either working memory or long-
term memory is reminiscent of Argyris and Schon’s
(1974) ‘theories of action’. They suggest that what
people say, the ‘espoused theory’, is different than
what they do, the ‘theory in use’. Asking someone
about their thoughts or beliefs on an issue elicits an
espoused theory that can be equated with a mental
model generated in working memory for the
purpose of answering a specific question (following
Brewer’s definition noted above). This involves
drawing on existing, deeply held, generic
knowledge to compile a specific knowledge
structure to answer a given question. Drawing on
long-term knowledge structures and combining
them in short-term memory involves a degree of
abstraction. This is therefore likely to increase the
degree of representational inaccuracy in the
generated mental model, or espoused theory.
According to Argyris and Schon (1974), when
someone ‘acts’ they rely on tacit knowledge
structures, what is referred to as the ‘theory in use’,
which may be equated with mental models existing
in long-term memory. Although these internal
representations of the world may be less error prone,
Argyris and Schon’s work suggests they are much
more difficult to elicit. This highlights one of the
key challenges associated with applying the mental
model construct, not only to NRM, but all
disciplines interested in the theoretical and practical
application of the construct. That is, how can we
differentiate and elicit the mental models that people
rely on to make decisions and act, rather than the
mental models which equate with Argyris and
Schon’s ‘espoused theory’?
Mental models stored in long-term memory are also
of particular interest to the field of cognitive
anthropology, which explores “how cultural
knowledge is organized in the mind” (D'Andrade
1995:279) . Studying culture at a cognitive level,
cognitive anthropologists use schema to explain
cultural understanding. Quinn (2005:38) defines
schema as “a generic version of (some part of) the
world built up from experience and stored in
memory”. ‘Cultural schema’ are therefore
developed through “shared” experiences (Quinn
2005:38). Over time, as a given group of people
internalize their shared experiences, cultural
meaning is created, which individuals use to
perceive and relate to the world around them (Quinn
2005).
Cultural models are discussed in a similar light to
collective mental models and shared mental models
in that they all refer to a degree of shared
understanding among a group people. The field of
organizational research takes a keen interest in
collective mental models on the assumption that
“effective team functioning requires the existence
of a shared or team mental model among members
of a team” (Langan-Fox et al. 2000:242). It is
interesting to note that some of this literature uses
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Table 1. Differences between mental models and schemata.
Author Basis of Differentiation Schemata Mental Models
Rutherford and Wilson
(2004:312)
Static vs. dynamic
structure
“...A procedural data structure in
memory”.
Use procedural data “in a
computationally dynamic
manner”.
Holland et al. (1986:13) Representational
flexibility
Inflexible knowledge structures
stored in long-term memory
provide “predictive knowledge
for highly regular and routine
situations”.
Flexible knowledge structure that
combines multiple schemata to
represent or simulate an
unfamiliar situation.
Brewer (1987:189) Generic vs. specific
knowledge
“...Precompiled generic
knowledge structures.”
“Specific knowledge structures
that are constructed to represent a
new situation through the use of
generic knowledge of space, time,
causality, and human
intentionality”.
the terms ‘shared’ and ‘team’ mental models
interchangeably (e.g., Klimoski and Mohammed
1994), however, the two are usually defined as
distinct constructs. A shared mental model is the
mental model constructed and shared when
individuals interact together in a team setting, it
represents the shared cognition among groups of
individuals (Langan-Fox et al. 2001). A team model
is the collective task and team relevant knowledge
that team members bring to a situation (Cooke et al.
2000). The team’s collective and dynamic
understanding that they bring to a specific situation
is referred to as a team situation model (Cooke et
al. 2000).
Practitioners in the field of NRM have also recently
taken an interest in the idea of the collective or
shared mental model (Abel et al. 1998). To
encourage people with contrasting views to work
together, it is necessary to identify and support a
shared understanding among relevant stakeholders
and to enhance the collective decision making
process. The expansion of mental models research
from an individual to a collective focus stems from
a growing recognition that there is a social
component to cognition at the individual level, and
that decision making occurs at a range of scales from
an individual to group to societal level.
A dynamic representation
There is widespread agreement in the literature that
mental models are ‘working models’ (Craik 1943,
Johnson-Laird 1983) and are therefore dynamic.
The dynamic character of a mental model is
discussed in the literature in three ways, in relation
to reasoning, causal dynamics, and learning.
Reasoning
A defining feature of a mental model from a
psychology perspective is that it is a computational
structure (Rutherford and Wilson 2004). A mental
model is constructed in working memory and can
then be run like a computer simulation allowing an
individual to explore and test different possibilities
mentally before acting. Working memory is the
system responsible for selecting and manipulating
information for the purpose of reasoning and
learning. Changes made to a mental model in the
simulation process represent what would happen if
such changes took place in reality.
Causal dynamics
The second dynamic attribute of a mental model
discussed at length in the literature refers to ‘causal
knowledge’. The capacity of a mental model to
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represent (perceived) cause-and-effect dynamics of
a phenomenon is studied from a systems dynamics
and naive theory perspective. Researchers
interested in systems dynamics use the mental
model construct in a pragmatic sense: as a tool to
better understand complex, dynamic systems to
ultimately improve their design and usability (Doyle
and Ford 1998, Moray 2004). A widely cited
definition of a mental model in this context is that
of Rouse and Morris (1986) who consider a mental
model in terms of its functionality and conceive it
as a cognitive structure that enables a person to
describe, explain, and predict a system’s purpose,
form, function, and state. Given the focus on
dynamic phenomena, a mental model in this field
has been conceived of as a model that is built of
“causal knowledge about how a system works”
(Moray 1998:295).
Learning
The capacity of mental models to change over time
through experience and learning is another dynamic
quality often referred to in the literature.
Researchers, mainly from the fields of human-
computer interaction (HCI), education, and
organizational studies, take interest in the difference
between lay (or student) and expert mental models
in terms of knowledge content and organization.
Research shows that lay understanding is
characteristically concrete while expert understanding
is more abstract (DiSessa 1983, Greeno 1983,
Larkin 1983). This highlights the idea that the
formation of a mental model in a person’s mind is
the result of both biology, i.e., an ability inherent to
the human mind, and ‘learning’ (Nersessian 2002).
Nersessian (2002:140) states that, “the nature and
richness of models one can construct and one’s
ability to reason develops with learning domain-
specific content and techniques”.
Systems dynamics researchers focus on the role of
mental models in information feedback loops. They
are particularly interested in the problems which
hinder information feedback in a system and
therefore hinder learning (Doerner 1980, Brehmer
1992).
An inaccurate and incomplete representation
Mental models tend to be functional rather than
complete or accurate representations of reality. A
mental model is a simplified representation of
reality that allows people to interact with the world.
Because of cognitive limitations, it is neither
possible nor desirable to represent every detail that
may be found in reality. Aspects that are represented
are influenced by a person’s goals and motives for
constructing the mental model as well as their
background knowledge or existing knowledge
structures, which, as noted above, may be
conceptualized as ‘mental models existing in long
term memory’. Mental models thus play a role in
filtering incoming information. The theory of
‘confirmation bias’ (Klayman and Ha 1989)
suggests that people seek information that fits their
current understanding of the world. Incoming
information may reinforce existing mental models
or may be rejected outright.
Different fields of study are interested in, and
therefore view, the inaccurate and incomplete
quality of mental models differently. Those
applying the mental model construct to complex
systems regard the mapping process involved in
constructing a mental model as a many-to-one
‘homo-morphic’ mapping. This involves decomposing
a complex system into a number of smaller models
representing subcomponents of the system.
Conceiving the construction of mental models in
this way suggests that the model is an “imperfect
representation” and acknowledges that people make
errors (Moray 2004). Similarly, systems dynamics
researchers draw attention to peoples’ cognitive
limitations in terms of processing information
feedback, particularly when there are long time
delays between action and response (Sterman
1994). Controlled experiments, mainly computer-
based, show that people’s mental models
demonstrate a limited capacity to take account of
feedback delays and the side effects of decisions
made (Doerner 1980, Brehmer 1992). In his study
of mental models, Sterman (1994:305) concluded
that “people generally adopt an event-based, open-
loop view of causality, ignore feedback processes,
fail to appreciate time delays between action and
response and in the reporting of information, and
are insensitive to non-linearities that may alter the
strengths of different feedback loops as a system
evolves”. This literature treats these limitations in
people’s mental models as presenting an
impediment to learning; it assumes that addressing
the limitations and critical flaws in mental models
can improve system functionality.
Despite their potential limitations, individuals’
mental models are not necessarily amenable to
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alteration. As the psychology literature recognizes,
people tend to filter new information according to
its congruence or otherwise with their existing
understandings, beliefs, and values. They may reject
discrepant evidence, or compartmentalize it within
a subsystem of larger systems of understanding.
Acceptance of new information is also related to
personal orientations toward learning. Some mental
models research therefore focuses on communication
toward outcomes such as behavior change, seeking
to provide information in forms compatible with
current understandings (Morgan et al. 2002).
MENTAL MODEL ELICITATION IN
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Interest in mental models is gaining momentum
within the domain of NRM as practitioners
increasingly recognize the need to take into account
the plurality of values and goals linked to a given
resource and the range of stakeholder perceptions
concerning how NRM systems function. Mental
models are elicited for the following reasons:
 
l
 To explore similarities and differences
between stakeholders’ understanding of an
issue to improve communication between
stakeholders (Abel et al. 1998) ;
 
l
 To integrate different perspectives, including
expert and local, to improve overall
understanding of a system (Ozesmi and
Ozesmi 2004);
 
l
 To create a collective representation of a
system to improve decision making processes
(Dray et al. 2006);
 
l
 To support social learning processes (Pahl-
Wostl and Hare 2004);
 
l
 To identify and overcome stakeholders’
knowledge limitations and misconceptions
associated with a given resource (Morgan et
al. 2002);
 
l
 To develop more socially robust knowledge
to support negotiations over unstructured
problems in complex, multifunctional
systems (Kolkman et al. 2005).
The mental model construct is attractive to NRM
practitioners in that it takes account of the concepts
that stakeholders consider relevant or important to
a domain, and of the way in which stakeholders
structure or organize those concepts cognitively.
This provides insight into stakeholders’ understanding
of the interconnected and dynamic attributes of
NRM systems. Biggs et al. (2008:3) situate the
construct within the field of NRM by defining it as
a cognitive structure comprised of “representations
of objects, their relationships and dynamics as well
as the attributes or characteristics of these and the
person’s valence (cognitive and emotional) to the
objects, relationships, and dynamics”.
A variety of elicitation techniques have been used
in the field of natural resource management to serve
different purposes. The majority of procedures used
are based on the assumption that an individual’s
mental model can be represented as a network of
concepts and relations. Some procedures are
designed to elicit a network representation of a
mental model directly from the interviewee through
a diagrammatic interview. Other procedures require
the researcher to re-create, or infer, the network
from oral interview data or questionnaire data.
Direct elicitation
Direct elicitation procedures require interviewees
to form a representation of their understanding of a
given issue. Participants may be asked to draw a
diagrammatic representation of their mental model,
using pictures, words, and symbols, or they may be
provided with existing concepts on a set of cards
and asked to arrange them into a representation.
Assisting participants to view the external
representation of their mental model through the
nature of the elicitation process provides an
immediate means of verification that is lacking in
the indirect elicitation procedures.
Kearney and Kaplan propose the Conceptual
Content Cognitive Map (3CM) method (originally
developed by Austin, cited in Kearney and Kaplan
1997). This technique involves asking participants
to identify concepts they consider important to a
domain and then asking them to spatially/visually
organize them in a way that depicts how they
understand that domain (see Kearney and Kaplan
1997). The spatial mapping exercise is believed to
be highly compatible with human information
processing (Pezdek and Evans, as cited in Kearney
and Kaplan 1997). A major strength of the approach
is that the mapping exercise assists interviewees to
explore their own cognitive structure as they engage
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with the task (Austin 1994). This stance is supported
by studies that suggest cognition is not only
language-based but also image-based and that
verbal and imagistic thought are carried out by two
distinct, though partly connected, systems (Kearney
and Kaplan 1997:595). The 3CM technique has
been used in the field of NRM to explore the nature
of different stakeholders’ perspectives in the context
of forest management (Austin 1994, Kearney et al.
1999, Tikkanen et al. 2006). Analysis involves a
combination of qualitative and quantitative
procedures to determine the similarity and
dissimilarity in stakeholder’s views.
Ozesmi and Ozesmi (2004) used a similar approach,
referred to as fuzzy cognitive mapping, to explore
stakeholders’ perceptions of the causes and effects
of lake eutrophication. Similarly to Kearney and
Kaplan’s 3CM approach, Ozesmi and Ozesmi elicit
mental models by asking interviewees to begin by
defining the important variables in a given system.
These are written on a set of cards. Participants are
then given the opportunity to arrange the cards to
reflect their understanding of a given issue. Ozesmi
and Ozesmi’s approach is designed to elicit an
interviewee’s causal understanding of a system and
thus targets the cause and effect relationships
between concepts. Participants are asked to specify
these relationships in the constructed diagram.
Graph theory tools that apply mathematical
algorithms are then used to explore the complexity
of the network diagrams, their density, i.e., how
connected or sparse they are, as well as the type and
frequency of variables featured. Ozesmi and
Ozesmi (2004) state that “By examining the
structure of maps we can determine how
stakeholders view the system, for example whether
they perceive a lot of forcing functions affecting the
system which are out of their control, or whether
they see the system as hierarchical or more
democratic” (Ozesmi and Ozesmi 2004:50).
According to Ozesmi and Ozesmi (2004:50), “If
some groups perceive more relationships, they will
have more options available to change things. Thus
these groups may be a catalyst for change”. It is
important to note that this does not mean that a
greater understanding of how a system functions
equates with a greater capacity to initiate change
because other factors come into play including the
social, political, and economic context. The authors
suggest that a more comprehensive understanding
of a given system means a wider range of
interventions can be explored. Data representing
peoples’ mental models of cause and effect relations
within a system can be used to build computer
simulation models that explore different resource
management scenarios. Local stakeholders thus
play a key role in building the models that guide
resource management policy and planning. Ozesmi
and Ozesmi (2004) state that this form of
participatory modeling is preferable to other forms
of science-based ecological modeling in situations
where 1) expert and scientific data is limited,
whether it be uncertain and/or unavailable, and 2)
stakeholder support for management initiatives is
required.
Dray et al. (2006) used a similar diagrammatic
interview method to elicit understanding of causal
dynamics of groundwater management in the atoll
of Tarawa, Republic of Kiribati. This experiment
involved asking participants to build a diagram by
placing cards indicating relevant concepts (factors
or dynamics) on a large piece of paper and drawing
the relations between them. The data was combined
with data collected from a photo interpretation and
a spatial mapping exercise, to build a ‘collective
representation’ of the groundwater system. This
provided the basis upon which an agent-based
model and role playing game were designed that
were used as negotiation and decision making
support tools in the context of groundwater
management. Through interacting with these tools,
participants were able to explore and challenge their
own and others’ mental models (Dray et al. 2007).
Participatory modeling initiatives relying on mental
model elicitation techniques to build a collective
representation, or ‘shared mental model’, of a given
system have also been used in a number of resource
management projects to support collective decision
making (Lynam et al. 2002) and social learning
processes (Pahl-Wostl and Hare 2004). The Actors,
Resources, Dynamics and Interaction (ARDI)
method is one such method used for this purpose
(Etienne et al. 2011, Mathevet et al. 2011). It
involves systematically asking participants, either
individually or as a group, who and what they
consider to be the key actors, resources, and
processes, or dynamics, within a system and the
interactions between these. This exercise creates a
representation of an individual or group mental
model of the system in the form of an influence
diagram that can be used to guide the development
of a resource management plan or used as a dialogue
support tool.
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Indirect elicitation
Carley and Palmquist (1992) propose that a
representation of a mental model, made up of
concepts and relations, can be extracted from
written documents or verbal text, which may be
elicited via an interview. The verbal structure
identified within a text is a sample of the full
symbolic representation of an individual’s cognitive
structure (Carley, Fauconnier, and Sowa, as cited in
Carley and Palmquist 1992).
Abel et al. (1998) used the transect walk method
involving a combination of open-ended and
semistructured interview questions while walking
an area to elicit people’s understanding of causal
dynamics of landscape processes. The aims of this
study were to develop a methodology to elicit
mental models of landscape systems, and to explore
similarities and differences in stakeholder groups’
understanding in the context of land management.
The study was motivated by an acknowledgment
that differences in understanding hinder communication
and cooperation between stakeholders and therefore
impede management efforts. Interview data from
pastoralists, extension officers, and research
scientists was analyzed using content analysis then
statistical analysis to identify and compare
differences between interviewees in emphasis on
landscape characteristics and ecological processes,
and the causal linkages between these. Direct causal
connections between landscape variables were
recorded in a matrix. The matrix data was then
converted into an influence diagram, also referred
to as a ‘causal network diagram’, using Vensim, a
simulation and decision support package, then the
INFLUENCE program (Walker 1997). The
resulting diagrams were taken as representing
stakeholders’ mental models of the causal dynamics
of the system. The authors remind us, however, that
these representations of mental models are
influenced by the skill of the interviewer and the
extent to which the interviewee is able to verbalize
his or her understanding of causal dynamics. This
capacity is likely to differ across individuals and
groups, with researchers and extension officers
presumably more versed in communicating their
ideas in such a context (Abel et al. 1998).
One approach to mental model elicitation that does
not seek to represent a mental model as a network
of concepts and relations is consensus analysis
(discussed in greater detail in Stone-Jovicich et al.
2011). This approach, originating in the field of
cognitive anthropology, is designed to investigate
the distribution of cultural knowledge among a
given group of people. Cultural knowledge is
conceived of as an ‘information pool’ that is held
within the minds of individuals. It is assumed that
there is variability in the amount of information held
by each individual and the extent to which this
information is shared. The consensus analysis
literature refers to the part of the information pool
that each individual holds within their mind as
‘schema’. These are defined as “networks of
strongly connected cognitive elements that
represent the generic concepts stored in memory”
(Strauss and Quinn 1997:6) and thus can be thought
of as mental models.
Consensus analysis was designed to investigate the
content of individual’s mental models, referred to
as ‘schema’, and the extent to which there is an
overlap in content, or ‘shared understanding’,
among a given group of people. Concepts are
identified using open-ended interviews or free
listing tasks that involve asking interviewees to list
items relevant to a given topic, for example,
medicinal plants found in a given area. Thereafter,
in a second phase a different set of interviewees are
asked to sort, rank, or answer yes/no questions to
determine the similarity of responses across
interviewees or items. Consensus analysis relies on
statistical analysis, i.e., factor analysis or cluster
analysis, to measure the degree of consensus, or
‘shared knowledge’, among individuals.
CHALLENGES IN APPLYING THE
MENTAL MODEL CONSTRUCT TO
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The mental model construct has the potential to
provide insight into peoples’ understanding of
natural processes and hence natural resource
management. It provides a mechanism that may
enhance our ability to understand the motivations
for human behavior where other social science
constructs, such as attitudes, values, and beliefs,
have proved limited. In realizing this potential, a
number of research challenges must be addressed.
An initial challenge involves the issue of elicitation,
which raises a number of pertinent methodological
research questions. What are the relative strengths
and weaknesses of direct and indirect mental model
elicitation, and particular elicitation and analysis
techniques? Do different methods suit different
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contexts and purposes? How well do they overcome
the challenge of valid external representation of
barely accessible modes of thinking? How
successful are they in their own rights, and how
much do they depend on the skill of the social
scientist conducting and interpreting the elicitation
method? To what extent do interpersonal factors,
such as trust and honesty, affect the process of
elicitation and consequently the external representation
of a mental model and its future use? These
questions cannot readily be answered from the
literature available to date; they are the subject of
further research by the authors.
A problem closely tied to this issue of elicitation
relates to Argyris and Schon’s (1974) ‘theories of
action’. That is, how do we know whether the
elicited mental model represents the interviewee’s
‘espoused theory’ (what they say) or their ‘theory
in use’ (what they do)? The eventual discrepancies
between these often explain conflicts observed
between mental and, so-called, behavioral models.
If mental models are assumed to be the cognitive
mechanism upon which reasoning, decision
making, and behavior are based, in some cases,
depending on the research purpose, it is the ‘theory-
in-use’ version of the mental model in which we are
most interested.
If the mental model construct is to be used as a
theoretical tool to better understand how people
think about and thus interact with natural resource
systems, or a practical tool to support collective
decision making and action, further research on the
relationships between individual and collective
mental models is also required.
CONCLUSION
Using the mental model construct to gain insight
into how people conceive, and therefore are inclined
to act toward, the world around them is, theoretically
speaking, an attractive proposition for natural
resource management practitioners. A mental
model approach to cognition goes beyond
stakeholders’ preferences, goals, and values
associated with a given resource, to provide a rich
picture of how stakeholders perceive natural
resource systems to function. This picture can tell
us not only what concepts stakeholders’ consider
important to a given issue, but also how these
concepts are organized cognitively and the dynamic
interactions between them. It offers some insight
into how people comprehend a system, how they
believe the system might respond to interventions,
and how they might intervene themselves.
Similarities and differences in understanding can be
compared across time and space to improve overall
understanding of a given system and to support
collective action.
Theoretical evidence continues to mount within the
fields of psychology and cognitive science that
people do indeed use mental models to reason and
make predictions about the world around them.
However, there remain a number of challenges to
be able to situate the construct effectively within the
NRM domain. One initial challenge is to continue
to improve methods of eliciting mental models.
Systems of interest in the domain of NRM are
complex and dynamic, functioning at a range of
temporal and spatial scales. Elicitation techniques
therefore need to be capable of incorporating this
complexity and they need to be capable of clear and
legitimate representation of people’s thinking.
Although other fields of study, such as systems
research and risk communication, have much to
offer in this regard, further research is required to
assess the relative merits of existing techniques and
develop new techniques suited to the NRM field.
Actors within the NRM context are typically
diverse, coming from a range of socio-cultural
backgrounds. Elicitation techniques therefore need
to cater to the interpersonal diversity and
complexity of actor relationships inherent to the
field of NRM. A rich mental models approach in
NRM might thus seek to build communication and
collaboration across actors by using mental models
as a means of mutual understanding (Abel et al.
1998). It would ensure elicitation of mental models
in a holistic way, that goes beyond mental models
of biophysical and tangible processes to incorporate
peoples’ understandings of governance, and inter-
actor relationships, including trust and differing
values.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art46/
responses/
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